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Chapter 12 
 
From Jevons to Collini (via Douglas Davies): Reflections on Higher Education and Religious 
Identity 
 
Mathew Guest 
 
 
During my time as an undergraduate student in Theology at the University of Nottingham 
during the mid-1990s, Douglas Davies taught the anthropology of religion. In one of his 
especially inter-disciplinary lectures, he addressed the work of Frank Byron Jevons, a 
Victorian polymath whose life and work had fascinated Davies so much that he wrote his 
intellectual biography after being granted access to Jevons’ unpublished papers, housed at 
their shared alma mata, the University of Durham. Jevons was a classicist and philosopher, a 
pioneer in the embryonic study of religion, a lay Anglican and a speaker and writer on a 
variety of other subjects, including education. His strongly held convictions about the proper 
character of a good education are inspiring in their principled idealism, and serve as a 
valuable point of reference in considering reforms to education in schools and universities in 
the present day.  In considering Jevons’ time and work, we are alerted to the cultural changes 
that have transformed common assumptions about the purpose and delivery of educational 
processes over the last century; while Durham is a place steeped in tradition, its university is 
a radically different kind of institution from the one overseen by Jevons as its one-time Vice 
Chancellor at the beginning of the twentieth century. But reflection on Jevons’ perspective on 
the role of education as a social good also highlights the moral imperatives that have 
informed critical voices in his time and our own. His fiercely held and widely voiced views 
on education are, to a degree, echoed among critics of educational reform within 21st century 
Britain. In this sense, Jevons epitomises an enduring disposition, generated among university 
academics as a critical perspective on the very processes their institutions have come to 
embody.  
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 This essay considers current debates about the changing nature of university 
education within the UK context. It begins with Jevons, then brings his work into 
conversation with one of the most influential and insightful critics of recent higher education 
reform, Stefan Collini. My argument is that in highlighting their shared, underlying moral 
imperatives, we are presented with a useful lens through which to consider common 
assumptions about the capacity of universities to transform the identities of their students.  
Much debate about the state of higher education rests on assumptions about this matter, and 
yet empirical evidence is rarely used to connect the impassioned rhetoric with the experiences 
of students themselves. The second part of my argument calls for a greater dialogue between 
the critical voices exemplified by Jevons and Collini and a sociology of higher education that 
takes seriously empirical realities on the ground, including institutional structures and the 
social interaction among staff and students. By way of illustration, the final part of the essay 
takes students of faith – in this case Christian students in particular – as a case study, drawing 
on recent research into how the experience of universities shapes their moral and religious 
perspectives. Consideration of this segment of the student population highlights the complex 
ways in which universities impact upon the lives of their students, as well as offering insights 
into how religious identities are constituted within higher education. However, I begin with 
Jevons, because his convictions about education – even though published a century ago – 
actually serve as a useful way into these contemporary debates. In this respect, I also pay 
tribute to Douglas Davies, who has long sustained a passion for bringing the Victorian age 
and our present one into fruitful conversation.  
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Visions of Education in Two Ages 
Frank Byron Jevons had been a school master before coming to the University of Durham as 
a philosophy lecturer, where he stayed for the rest of his academic career. His perspective on 
education, I know, from numerous impassioned comments and lively conversations over the 
years, inspired and continues to inspire Douglas Davies and informs his own university 
teaching. Jevons believed in the liberating power of education, holding it to be a major force 
for social progress and equality for all, including marginalized segments of society such as 
women and the working classes. Jevons also taught courses for the Workers’ Educational 
Association (WEA), aimed at sharing university-level education with members of the local 
community. Indeed, Jevons was inclined to see the WEA initiatives as superior to school and 
university education because they were founded on the principle that no examinations would 
be held. This, for Jevons, allowed the WEA to embody the true value of education, which 
was about human flourishing, rather than passing exams, or indeed, the acquisition of 
qualifications as an instrumental means to economic betterment. As Davies puts it, describing 
Jevons’ viewpoint, “Prizes and degrees cause a man to work for his own ends while the 
unselfish desire for education worked out in a group is nobler and conduces to the good of 
many.” (Davies 1991: 119) This gets to the heart of Jevons’ attitude, which rests on the 
importance of co-operation, both as a central characteristic of good education and a desirable 
value to encourage within society as a whole. Indeed, competition – the opposite of co-
operation – Jevons associates not just with the fostering of self-centred possessiveness, but 
also with humankind’s propensity for conflict and war. Jevons’ perspective on education is a 
symptom of a much more all-encompassing worldview, and in this sense his confidence 
perhaps mirrors the Victorian propensity for grand narrative so typical of the scholarship of 
his time. Jevons was an idealist, as Davies acknowledges, and his idealism is embedded 
within a coherent vision of the ‘good society’, arguably as compelling as it is ambitious. 
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 While very much a product of his era, in other respects Jevons embodies an enduring 
set of concerns for which we can find ready analogies in the twenty-first century. Davies cites 
one of Jevons’ more impassioned speeches on the proper character of education: 
 
“If each man is an end in himself – an end as valuable and as precious as any other 
man – then an education which fits him merely to be a means is no complete 
education, no true education. Serve one another we must; and our education must 
enable us to do service. But it is no part of the function of education to make us useful 
instruments whereby the millionaire may increase his millions. We too have a right to 
the education which shall enable us to taste the higher joys of life.” (quoted in Davies 
1991: 131) 
 
Jevons believed knowledge within the right kind of education could free the mind from 
external authority and foster wisdom. What is anathema to him is the reduction of education 
to a process of conferring skills for the sole purpose of future employment. Faced with the 
poor working classes of County Durham around the turn of the twentieth century, he does not 
view education as something to be debased to their circumstances (reduced to an elementary 
provision) nor accommodated to their industrial occupations (translated into practical skills). 
Rather, he wants to take higher learning beyond the preserve of the university and into their 
lives as a universally edifying good. In a striking parallel, his dismay at an 
instrumentalisation of education is poignantly echoed in critiques of higher education reforms 
that have emerged in recent years. Increasing student numbers and cuts in public funding 
have emerged in the UK alongside policy reforms which increasingly conceive the value of 
universities in chiefly economic terms (Browne 2010). Serving first and foremost the need to 
enable students to contribute to the global economy, universities are treated as providers of 
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educational product and their students as consumers of it (Sabri 2011), echoing the logics of a 
neo-liberal economics that celebrates diversification via unfettered competition and the 
festishisation of individual choice. With increasing pressures on today’s universities to justify 
their degree programmes on the basis of ‘transferable skills’ and ‘employability’, one can see 
why academic commentators might find common voice with Jevons in their efforts to resist 
the commercialization of university life.  
 One of the most scathing critics of such innovations is the Cambridge Professor of 
Intellectual History and English Literature Stefan Collini, whose book What are Universities 
For? (2012) is a collection of essays on this subject. Collini’s essays are subtle and 
perceptive, witty and humorous, and his concerns about how universities have become less 
and less unlike other – especially commercial – organisations within British society over the 
course of the last couple of decades, are echoed among academics across the sector. In fact, 
Collini’s work is but one example of the abundance of literature produced over the past few 
years by academics and other commentators who find in the contemporary university an all-
absorbing bureaucracy and slavish kowtowing to the business world as efficiency and cost-
effectiveness encroach ever more on the hallowed freedoms of scholarship (e.g. Brown 2013; 
Giroux 2014; McGettigan 2013; Murphy 2015). As Collini puts it with characteristically 
acerbic wit, 
 
“One of the supposed benefits of treating universities as though they were businesses 
is that their efficiency can then be measured and improved. It’s well known that 
universities used to be full of idle, port-swilling dons and equally idle, unemployable 
students, but now they are lean and mean and geared to meeting national needs 
through increased productivity. One thing that needs saying in the face of this self-
deluded and self-important twaddle is that in several important ways universities are 
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now less efficient than they were twenty years ago before the commercial analogy 
started to be applied in earnest. After all, two of the most important sources of 
efficiency in intellectual activity are voluntary cooperation and individual autonomy. 
But these are precisely the kinds of things for which a bureaucratic system leaves little 
room.” (Collini 2012: 134)    
 
 In addition to lambasting the extent to which universities have become caught up in 
misconceived logics of efficiency and control, Collini is particularly concerned about the 
instrumentalisation of higher education. He is keen to preserve a sense of its value that is not 
reducible to a practical – especially economic – end. In this he echoes Jevons, and although 
he does not cite him nor show any signs of being aware of his work, he does engage with 
similar concerns raised by John Henry Newman in the mid-19th century, highlighting the 
historical lineage of this modern debate (Collini 2012: 39-60). Indeed, it is possible to draw a 
line between Jevons and Collini in terms of common clusters of ideals, each constituting a 
normative vision that is in some important respects reflective of the other. Here, cultural and 
intellectual context is important. Jevons’ thinking is shaped by a late Victorian socialism 
coloured by his experience as an educator in the industrial north of England. Collini 
embodies the disillusioned perspective of a Cambridge don who views his age as one in 
which higher education has morphed from public good into consumer product, via depleted 
funding, increased bureaucracy and increasingly centralized systems of oversight and 
accountability. The thinking of both arises out of elite British universities and assumes an 
understanding of education shaped by the disciplines of the humanities, foregrounding the 
expansion of critical thinking and the irreducible value of knowledge as a human good. This 
understanding is pitched over and against encroaching forces governed by a logic that is 
utilitarian, informed by the concerns of industry and private business and the reduction of the 
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individual to the status of self-interested agent. While operating within very different 
circumstances, both Jevons and Collini emerge within a scholarly tradition of reactionary 
critique contingent upon cultural trends commonly viewed as characteristic of the late 
modern age. The archetypal narrative here is Max Weber’s sociological account of a 
disenchanted modernity confined by the ‘iron cage’ of rationalizing systems (Gerth and Mills 
2009: 196-264). Many have developed Weber’s portrayal, including those who see in the 
contemporary world new systems of rationalized control emanating into a variety of social 
spheres as well as migrating from the west to the developing world (Ritzer 1996). Three lines 
of thought seem most relevant to the current discussion, commonly integrated into 
sociological debates about the transition from traditional to modern societies. These might be 
described as, firstly, the functional differentiation of social spheres – including the 
decoupling of traditional institutions, including those concerned with education, health, 
religion and politics. A consequent tendency here is the emergence of specialist providers 
whose purpose is defined in increasingly narrow terms and whose processes are increasingly 
segmented into discrete sub-divisions (Berger, Berger and Kellner 1974). Within the 
university context, a prime example would be modularization, which contains teaching and 
learning within relatively self-contained, discretely assessed courses. A second aspect of 
Weber’s legacy that is particularly relevant here is the related proliferation of utilitarian 
habits of thought characterized by an instrumental rationality. Robert Bellah et al (1985) 
theorized this as one dimension of western individualism in the late modern age, ‘utilitarian 
individualism’ being the tendency to forge identities in accordance with self-interest 
(emerging alongside ‘expressive individualism’, which foregrounds individual experience). 
While accounting for patterns in individual decision making, a more resonant definition for 
our purposes would also pay attention to how forms of instrumental rationality are embedded 
within institutional cultures, not least via bureaucratic systems of organization. A third aspect 
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that extends Weber’s model into a neo-liberal context is the growing tendency for the ‘ends’ 
of processes to be justified in economic terms. In university contexts, this includes the 
configuration of research so as to maximize the generation of external funding, but also the 
measurement of the success of university processes of teaching and learning according to 
cost-benefit analysis. On a deeper level is the complicit tendency to treat knowledge itself as 
a commodity, to be guarded, manipulated and negotiated in a way that maximizes ‘return’ 
(Kenway et al 2006: 55). While these trends are manifest differently within the contexts in 
which Jevons and Collini are each working, they arguably proceed along the same trajectory. 
In other words, Collini is responding to the long-term amplification of the tendencies Jevons 
sees in embryonic form within his own industrial age. 
 Utilitarian habits of thought also inform assumptions within universities about 
accountability (Strathern 2000). For example, Collini calls attention to how, while freedom of 
intellectual enquiry is acknowledged by government policy makers to be essential to good 
scholarship, there is nevertheless among them a perennial return to the question of how useful 
university activity really is. The language of utility is telling, and Collini is under no illusions 
about what is primarily meant by this: universities are increasingly measured by the extent to 
which their work serves the needs of the economy. This is what lies behind the recent 
emphasis on integrating skills that enhance ‘employability’ into undergraduate and 
postgraduate programmes, and informs the increasing prioritization of STEM subjects 
(science, technology, engineering and mathematics) at the expense of other areas of 
scholarship. Collini sees a tension here that belies muddled thinking among policy makers, 
who while supporting a free market model that permits no measure of a university subject’s 
worth beyond student demand, at the same time wish to preserve a privileged status for 
STEM subjects, whose economic value is presumably taken for granted. But Collini advances 
a more fundamental critique, calling into question the very criterion of economic value when 
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used to justify university activity, a criterion he argues is presented in government policy 
documents – such as the recent Browne report on higher education funding (Browne 2010) - 
as if it were self-evident. Such is the pervasiveness of neo-liberal reasoning that arguments 
based on ‘economic output’ are not seen as in need of further justification. Collini takes a 
different view, pointing out that this assumption “begs the question of what needs the 
economy serves.” (2012: 110) If it enables us to do the things we think are important, as 
Collini puts it, we should decide what’s important and adapt our economic strategies to the 
task of bringing this about. As it stands, we are in danger of simply spending money for the 
sake of generating more money.   
 But it is not simply the reduction of academic work to economic ends that Collini 
finds most objectionable; it is the instrumentalist reasoning that misrepresents and perverts 
the nature of university life. We have become uncomfortable, he argues, with the language of 
‘intrinsic goods’, preferring instead to see the worth of an activity in measurable quantities. 
And yet the most important goals of a university are not quantifiable; they are not amenable 
to measurement, only to judgment by those competent to judge. Here he touches on a perhaps 
deep cultural tendency in English life that associates judgment with prejudice or snobbery. 
This tendency, at least in today’s context, calls into suspicion human capacities that cannot be 
called to account with reference to a set of measurable outcomes. Moreover, an emphasis on 
measurable outcomes is morally validated by its advocates with reference to the values of 
transparency and fairness, making it difficult to contest without appearing self-interested or 
having something to hide. But as suggested by Jevons, such instrumentalist thinking is often 
distinguished by its tendency to disempower, rather than the opposite, for it reduces scholarly 
endeavor to a conveyer belt of skills and capital, and also denies the marginalized in society 
the vision of an irreducible higher learning so often enjoyed and coveted among the elite. 
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 Collini also echoes Jevons in his wariness towards competition within educational 
contexts. Granted, Collini is talking about academic staff and Jevons is concerned with 
students, but they share a vision for intellectual enquiry that has co-operation at its heart. As 
Collini puts it, “Cooperation and a sense of shared commitment to the enterprise is infinitely 
more fruitful” (2012: 135) than setting individuals against one another in a battle to the top 
(or, a battle to flee the bottom, as may well be the case). Collini expands on this by outlining 
his view of university work as essentially a creative task, about ideas and intellectual 
endeavour that is most effectively stimulated by co-operation and mutual, supportive 
engagement. This is a vision that would resonate with Jevons, the idealist champion of 
education as a source of enrichment and human flourishing, both at the level of the 
individual, and in its capacity to edify the group.    
 
The Collective and the Individual in University Education 
While there is now abundant literature on the structural changes to the higher education 
sector that have come about in recent years, there is precious little on how these changes have 
affected the lives of university students. Does the commercialization of the sector encourage 
a more hard-headed ambition among undergraduates? Do they approach their university lives 
less as seekers after new knowledge, more as consumers keen to extract maximum advantage 
from their – now much more expensive – degree programmes? Or is there a residual idealism 
among arts and humanities students, perhaps, an ambition for a broadening of the mind that 
would warm the hearts of Jevons and Collini alike? Or are such students generally confined 
to the elite universities, comprised of upper middle class undergraduates who can afford to 
muse on the writings of Dickens or Coleridge, or debate the moral bankruptcy of the ‘new 
left’, precisely because they do not have to worry about their career chances after they 
graduate? According to this analysis, the visions of education promoted by Jevons and Collini 
11 
 
are not only idealistic, they are also destined to be the preserve of the privileged few, an 
outcome that would be painfully ironic, given Jevons’ ethical and political convictions. 
 Both Collini and Jevons present a vision of education that resists the elevation of the 
atomized individual, and instead foregrounds the collective energies of the co-operating 
group. However, while both consistently affirm the process of education to be a collaborative 
one, neither offer a developed description of how the outcomes of education might be public, 
rather than private. Jevons’ socialism leads him often to colour his impassioned speeches and 
writing with a vision for a better society, but this vision is often vague and as he is not aiming 
to develop a systematic sociology of education, his work lacks a concerted examination of the 
precise relationship between education and the social order. In this his work stands in contrast 
to his direct contemporary, French sociologist Emile Durkheim (Durkheim 1956). Collini 
offers much more comment on how higher education interrelates with wider society, but 
while he conceives government influence over universities as a corporate, bureaucratized 
imposition, his understanding of how universities influence society very much focuses on the 
level of the individual. In discussing students, his archetypes of choice are the employable 
graduate and the cultured scholar, each representing the anodyne and the enlightened in 
contemporary higher education respectively. Moreover, in reflecting on how universities 
might rescue something of value from the neo-liberal mire in which they find themselves, 
Collini has little to say about possible collectivist responses to society or novel methods of 
engagement that promote social change beyond the existentially inspired individual. The 
‘market model’ reconfigures the student as consumer and higher education as a process of 
economic exchange (Sabri 2011), arguably frustrating the capacity of universities to build 
community, so it is unfortunate that Collini does not have more to say about possible 
strategies for retrieving a collective voice.  
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 It is tempting to attribute this relative insularity to his Cambridge context, although I 
suspect it has more to do with how the disciplines of the humanities in particular deal with 
issues of human identity. Again, a comparison with Jevons is instructive. The problem of the 
coherence of the self is one in which Jevons had a strong interest, and his book Personality 
(1913) grapples with the philosophical problems surrounding our understanding of the self, 
identity and personality. While acknowledging that any striving towards unity and coherence 
is imperfect in practice, Jevons’ view of the self mirrors his view of society in so far as they 
point towards integration and co-operation rather than fragmentation and disintegration 
(Jevons 1913: 166). A framing influence here is Jevons’ Christian faith, and his argument that 
society is properly integrative and participatory, a shared experience in which all must play 
their part, owes as much to his conviction that this emerges in Christian love for one’s 
neighbor as it does to his communitarian political values. Jevons’ thinking is also shaped by 
his understanding of evolution, which he takes to be the model along which societies develop, 
but not necessarily for the better; in other words, we cannot take it for granted that unfettered 
human evolution will lead to uniformly positive outcomes – as he says, “evolution and 
progress are not identical.” (Jevons 1896: 88) As a consequence, we need to be vigilant, and 
here his passionate convictions about education are put into context; sound and ethical 
educational processes are essential if we are to ensure that human evolution does not leave 
the poor impoverished and the lost without hope. This interventionist vision reflects Jevons’ 
belief that education is about bringing about radical change – in individuals and in society – 
and that, for him, this ambition is inspired and validated by Christian teaching.  
 Collini’s work on universities emerges from a different kind of stable. As a literature 
scholar, he is fully aware of the subtleties of language and the politics of representation, and 
makes self-conscious use of his skills in scrutinizing aspects of university life through a 
critical lens. His sensitivity to emerging complexities means he is also cautious in offering 
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easy solutions to the problems he sees. In an amusing and perceptive essay on the ‘useful’ 
and the ‘useless’ in higher education, he observes how those arguing for a non-instrumentalist 
model are given to overstatement, seeming “inexorably driven to ambitious phrases about the 
most general and most desirable human qualities, about a vision of a civilized community, 
about the ends of life.” (Collini 2012: 52) His starting point in this essay is John Henry 
Newman’s Idea of a University (Newman 1966), which is subjected to a sardonic analysis 
that leaves little doubt as to Collini’s skepticism about both Newman’s inflated and 
ponderous prose, and his argument for theology as the governing disciplinary jurisdiction 
within which all other subjects realise their significance. And yet Collini is not entirely 
dismissive of Newman’s ambitious programme, and it is in this essay that his own 
perspective on how students might be transformed by university is most clearly expressed.  
 Collini is careful not to endorse a naïve vision -  still often rehearsed by academics in 
the humanities – based around universities generating knowledge ‘for its own sake’ and 
hence representing a kind of irreducible value entirely untainted by objectives that lie outside 
of the ‘pure’ cultivation of the mind. He acknowledges the legitimate place of vocational 
training and is mindful of how even the most traditionally ‘scholarly’ disciplines are shaped 
by self-justifications that appeal to their ‘usefulness’; he is not willing to jettison the language 
of utility altogether. And yet his attempts to characterize what is distinctive about the purpose 
of a university is permit external ends only insofar as they refer to the expansion of an 
individual student’s horizons. Part of this involves fostering a critical awareness of the 
contingency of different forms of knowledge, a hermeneutic of suspicion that bestows skills 
in discernment and critical evaluation. A similar perspective is offered by former Archbishop 
of Canterbury Rowan Williams, who sees a major goal of universities as helping people to 
become ‘intelligent citizens’, enabled to exercise critical thinking and so more responsibly 
navigate ‘the confused mass of propaganda and fashion that swirls around in the 
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overpopulated information culture of our age.’ (Williams 2014: 38) Adopting this 
understanding, it is easy to see how such an education could be a source of enrichment and 
empowerment for all people, whether faced with the common challenges of weighing up 
conflicting newspaper coverage, achieving a fair resolution to a neighborly dispute, or 
deciding how to vote in an election. According to Collini, that which is learned within 
universities is indeed “useful preparation for life” (Collini 2012: 56), but is distinctive insofar 
as the “open ended quest for understanding has primacy over any application or intermediate 
outcome.” (2012: 55) This language of ‘open-endedness’ coheres with assumptions about 
student learning that emphasise the broadening of the mind and the cultivation of cross-
disciplinary awareness, and perhaps these are the kinds of outcomes that Collini imagines as 
taking place within universities were they properly configured. In this, as in many other 
ways, Collini is forging a counter-narrative to the functional differentiation of higher 
education alluded to earlier. While working within a sector structured around discrete and 
rationalized processes – from the modularization of degree programmes to their justification 
via specialist committees and audit trails – his instinct is to challenge boundaries rather than 
exist comfortably within them. Moreover, it is this challenges of boundaries – disciplinary, 
epistemological, even ontological – that he places at the heart of his vision for a university 
education. Students will ideally leave university with a learnt capacity to exercise such 
transgressive practice, to their advantage and to the credit of their universities. And while 
Collini does not use the language of empowerment, his argument for fostering in students a 
sense of the “contingency and vulnerability of knowledge that is, in other settings, treated as 
so fixed and stable…” (2012: 57) hints at a vision for the emancipatory potential of higher 
education entirely in keeping with Jevons’ own perspective.  
 Given his tendency to conceive of the potential influence of universities primarily in 
terms of individuals, Collini may be accused of under-estimating the power of universities to 
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change society. Perhaps this is understandable given his jaded view of the current HE sector, 
and his essays often have a voice of exasperation at a sector already deeply infected by a neo-
liberal agenda. Put another way, it is difficult to read Collini without feeling the damage has 
already been done. But he does retain, as demonstrated above, a strong - if often implicit - 
emphasis on the individual student as a site of significant transformation. Collini’s graduate is 
– if all goes to plan – at once enlightened, empowered and rendered autonomous by an 
education that has unsettled prior assumptions but replaced them with a keen intellectual 
awareness. Both Jevons and Collini share an understanding of education that foregrounds the 
interior, empowering experience of a profoundly personal learning, and while Jevons alone 
integrates Christian social teaching into his perspective, both assume a process that provokes 
the changing of minds, and, in consequence, the changing of identities. It is worth asking, the 
university having been stripped of its capacity to change society, does Collini overestimate 
the capacity of the university to transform the lives of individuals? A question impossible to 
answer in the abstract, at this point it is necessary to consider the available empirical research 
that has recently been undertaken into the lives of students. 
 
Faith, Identity and the Student Experience 
Neither Jevons nor Collini are social scientists, and their reflections on the transformative 
potential of education operate on the level of ideas and broad reflections on the world around 
them, rather than on any concerted analysis of empirical data. Located firmly within the 
humanities, their preference is to deal in abstractions and also to privilege the cognitive and 
cerebral over the cultural or affective. Consequently, their treatments of education are 
compelling on account of their rhetorical elegance and conceptual nuance (not to mention 
their moral conviction), but they also lack an attentiveness to the perspectives and 
experiences of students. This is not meant as criticism - this is not what either of them set out 
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to do – but it does raise the question of how empirical research might enrich our 
understanding of universities by bringing into conversation their astute commentary and the 
actual experiences of being at university among students who are on the receiving end of the 
processes Collini so persuasively critiques.  
 My focus in the discussion below is on students of faith, particularly Christian 
students, whose experiences of university present an empirical case study that, I would argue, 
benefits from being framed by the work of both Jevons and Collini, especially as it 
constitutes a lens through which arguments about the transformative power of university 
education might be examined.  Recent research into student faith in the UK highlights both 
the contentious status of religious groups represented in universities, as well as the public 
discourses that position religion as irrelevance, oddity or risk (Dinham and Jones 2012; Guest 
et al 2013; Weller et al 2011). Recent government policy intended to tackle so-called 
‘radicalisation’ among university students raises particular concerns about the treatment of 
Muslims (Brown and Saeed 2014) while also highlighting a broader tendency to conceive of 
religious students as passive subjects. While the neo-liberal rhetoric of the Browne report 
(2010) emphasizes students as empowered consumers, best placed to decide what they want 
from higher education, religious students are frequently portrayed in public fora as credulous 
dupes or as dangerously suggestible, their agency presumably flawed because they have 
clearly made the ‘wrong’ choices. Faced with such problematic assumptions, an empirically 
based consideration of how processes of influence proceed among students of faith becomes 
especially important.  
 The importance of a Christian context for Jevons has already been noted, as has his 
understanding of both society and self as properly integrated and participatory rather than 
atomized and self-serving. Collini does not share Jevons’ framing hermeneutic of Christian 
love, but he does affirm an understanding of selfhood that assumes atomization is inimical to 
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a healthy and enriching educational experience. Universities do their job best when fostering 
a capacity to see beyond immediate horizons and across parameters of intellectual possibility, 
always open to new insight and never ossified into fixed canons of meaning (Collini 2013).  
  In this respect Collini echoes other scholars who express concern about the 
instrumentalisation of education and point to the growing tendency among both teachers and 
students to be assessment-led (refs?). A consequence of measuring school and university 
education by quantifiably structured league tables, and of reducing education to economic 
advancement, is the danger that education becomes thoroughly compartmentalized. 
Knowledge is taught and learnt for the purposes of securing qualifications, resulting in an 
arguably impoverished learning experience, the problems of which Jevons was well aware. In 
the process, subject matter is divided into convenient digestible chunks and managed 
accordingly, and students are made less aware of the connections between them, and of the 
creative possibilities for thought that only occur when disciplinary and topical boundaries are 
crossed, subverted, questioned and challenged. Within university-based teaching about 
religion, there prevails a persistent assumption that personal faith has no place inside of the 
classroom and that to permit discussion of student experiences of faith would somehow 
undermine the ‘objectivity’ of university study (Fairweather 2012). This tendency reinforces 
compartmentalization by affirming a clear differentiation between commitment and 
knowledge (Flanagan 2001). According to this approach – pervasive in public universities in 
the USA and across the UK Higher Education sector – religion constitutes an object to be 
studied, while religious convictions of students doing the studying ought to be ‘bracketed out’ 
and confined to non-academic contexts. As Fairweather highlights, this legacy of post-
Enlightenment rationalism persists even in the discipline of social anthropology, in which the 
personal experiences of religious actors have long been acknowledged as central to a proper 
understanding of the religious phenomena that are assumed to embody. Permitting the faith 
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lives of others into the classroom but not those of students themselves contributes to the 
‘othering’ of faith communities and perpetuates a false polarisation between ‘religion’ and 
the ‘secular’ (Fairweather 2012: 53). It also denies the university classroom a critical 
reflexivity that is defended and practised among academics undertaking social scientific 
research (Davies 1999). This secularization of the study of religion in universities has been 
criticized for not taking seriously the ways in which the perspectives of students – including 
their orientations to religion – shape the assumptions that frame the learning process. It 
similarly excludes the perspectives of university teachers, whose presentation of religious 
topics in the classroom may, as some recent research suggests, emerge as qualitatively 
distinct from how they conceptualise religion within their academic publications (Skeie 2015: 
138). An approach that prevents such inter-subjective dimensions to be openly addressed in 
the classroom risks an impoverished presentation of religion and a disempowering experience 
of university education. It presumes a ‘view from nowhere’, preventing an honest 
conversation permitted to acknowledge the genuine differences between human actors, 
differences that, when critically addressed, can actually advance our understanding of 
religion. 
 So compartmentalization has at least two dimensions: the separation of disciplines 
and sub-disciplines into discrete bodies of knowledge, and the differentiation of student 
identities that positions personal religious convictions outside of the classroom. Both invite a 
challenging of intellectual boundaries of a kind that Collini seems to advocate. And yet it is 
precisely this crossing of intellectual boundaries, associated with a heightened awareness of 
the contingency of knowledge and the complexity of human meaning-making - to which the 
humanities are especially sensitive - that has persistently been seen as undermining the 
plausibility of religion. Sociologist Peter Berger has gone as far as suggesting that, not only is 
western style higher education a vehicle for secularization, but the humanities and social 
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sciences are especially potent forces within this process (Berger 1999). It is the unremitting 
questioning of knowledge and its bases, something Collini sees as quintessential to both 
university life and the integrity of academic disciplines, that resonates with modes of thinking 
that encourage a critical perspective on religious truth, truth that, it is assumed, depends on 
foundationalist claims that cannot withstand this kind of analysis.  
 Aside from the assumptions and arguments of academics, this crossing of boundaries 
also provokes anxiety among some Christian students who fear their university education will 
damage their faith. This is not helped by the general weakening of the liberal tradition within 
Anglicanism, of which Jevons was an advocate, so that intellectual enquiry as a means of 
enriching Christian faith is not a notion familiar to many of today’s undergraduates. Indeed, 
as recent research has demonstrated, the most active and engaged Christian students are 
evangelicals (Guest et al, 2013). While this movement includes numerous variations and 
complexities, its dominant forms among students often privilege textual exposition of the 
Bible, leaving little room for contextual hermeneutics, and/or foreground charismatic worship 
and fellowship, favouring the experiential and subjective, with theological learning a 
secondary concern.  In addition, Theology and Religious Studies as a subject area has 
suffered continued decline in recent years, with falling undergraduate applications leading to 
academic departments shrinking, merging or, in some cases, closing, and, in some quarters, a 
continued institutionalized skepticism about whether religion should be the proper concern of 
universities at all (Dinham and Jones 2012). Intellectual engagement with matters of faith 
within the context of university is often either peripheral to the culture of student churches, or 
is channeled into parallel curricula: Bible studies and discussion groups facilitated by local 
churches along lines in keeping with their own theological perspectives. The Christian 
Unions – long established as the most well-resourced and influential of student Christian 
organizations – run their own scheme for supporting students struggling with how to relate 
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their faith to their studies. While such schemes may encourage intellectual engagement, it is 
an engagement whose boundaries and methods remain distinctive from those fostered within 
university degree programmes, often reflecting an underlying unease about the potential of 
university study to disrupt, challenge or undermine Christian faith. As might be expected, it is 
the evangelicals who are most concerned to address the interface between scholarship and 
faith as a challenge among Christian students.  
 And yet the evidence available suggests such anxieties might be misplaced, and that 
concerns among church leaders and evangelical organizations do not match the orientation to 
faith and study in evidence among the students themselves. Here I am drawing on research I 
undertook between 2009 and 2012 with Kristin Aune, Sonya Sharma and Rob Warner about 
the ways in which the experience of university shapes the lives of Christian undergraduate 
students (Guest et al, 2013). Notably, and keeping in mind my reservations about Jevons and 
Collini’s intellectualist tendencies discussed earlier, the ‘university experience’ here is not 
restricted to class-room based academic learning, but also includes the social experiences 
distinctive to university life. This approach is based on the observation that university 
encompasses a variety of human experiences that are often mutually constitutive within 
complex processes of identity formation (Stevens, Armstrong and Arum 2008). It also 
responds to a discernible tendency in academic literature on student faith to treat students as 
atomized individuals, decontextualized from the institutional cultures that frame their 
experiences (Mayrl and Oeur 2009).  
 The ‘Christianity and the University Experience’ (CUE) project deployed a national 
survey covering 13 universities across England, supplemented by case studies including 
interviews with staff and students at five universities selected so as to be representative of the 
institutional variety of the HE sector. In order to avoid being led by doctrinal or practical 
assumptions about what properly counts as ‘Christian’, the survey was targeted at a random 
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sample of all students and invited each respondent to identify the religious tradition to which 
they belonged. Allowing for sampling complications and taking into account comparative 
data, the proportion of self-identifying Christians we estimate at around 40-45% of the 
undergraduate population (a figure that reflects the proportion identified in the 2011 national 
census among young adults not working but in education) (Guest et al 2013: 211-217). 
Within this population, there was significant diversity of belief and religious practice. Not 
surprisingly, those most active in church attendance and in local volunteering are the 
evangelical students, and this is matched by resource and influence filtered through 
university-based organisations like the Christian Unions. However, these evangelicals only 
constitute at most 20% of the overall Christian student population, most of whom are more 
liberal in their morality and more uncertain in their commitment to core Christian doctrines. 
Around half of all Christian students never attend church during term-time, around a third 
never attend at all, regardless of context. Given self-identification was our method of 
ascertaining Christian identity, it is not surprising that a range of orientations has been found, 
and this certainly includes a small minority who view their Christian identity in solely 
cultural, rather than religious, terms. Perhaps most strikingly, a significant majority – almost 
75% - when asked whether their religious identities have become stronger or weaker since 
they started their university career, say they have more or less stayed the same. This is 
mirrored in the very low proportion – 5% - of students reporting a dramatic experience of 
conversion – either into or out of Christianity – since they embarked on their university 
studies. Stability of faith identities was the norm (cf. Bäckström 1993), a far cry from the 
‘crisis narrative’ that has, in the past, assumed faith and higher education to exist in fierce 
opposition (Paton 1946). 
 This finding provides a clue to a broader tendency among Christian students, a 
tendency to keep their religious identities and their identities as learners in higher education 
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markedly separate. Our survey allowed us to explore correlations between subject of degree 
programme and a range of other variables, including those related to religious belief, moral 
conviction and religious practice. There were no clear correlations between choice of degree 
and whether or not respondents self-identified as Christian, and subject choice could not be 
established as a predictor of responses to most questions about belief, morality or religious 
practice. An arguable exception relates to private prayer, with physical science students 
significantly more likely to say they never engaged in private prayer than students in 
medicine and allied subjects, social sciences or arts and humanities. One might attribute this 
to skepticism about an interventionist God or the supernatural more generally, although given 
it was medical students who were most likely to pray daily, the evidence does not point to a 
clear correlation between scientific training and skepticism about the act of prayer. Responses 
to a question about the relative authority of science and the Bible point in a different 
direction, with all four subject categories reasonably level in the degree to which they uphold 
creationism, intelligent design, evolution as the mechanism for divine creation, and the 
elevation of science above scripture respectively. The exception here is the social science 
students, who appear significantly less keen on elevating science above scripture, but who 
include a correspondingly high proportion saying they are ‘unsure’ about this issue; social 
scientists are just as likely or unlikely to affirm creationism, intelligent design or divinely 
established evolution as students in other disciplines.  
 Interviews with students also suggest minimal engagement between the subject matter 
of their degree programmes and the beliefs and values they hold to be essential to their 
Christian lives. Across subject areas, many Christian students did not seem to have 
considered how the new knowledge they had acquired might impact upon the assumptions 
they held as Christian believers – and this applies to fervently committed, church-attending 
Christians as well as those less engaged in conventional forms of Christian practice. The 
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notable exception was students in Theology and Religious Studies, for whom a much more 
active engagement in how class based learning might relate to their faith was in evidence, 
including reflection on meta-level questions such as how the faith orientations of lecturers 
might lead the class in a particular direction and if so, whether this was a legitimate part of 
the education process. For most Christian students, though, the encounter between 
scholarship and faith – something to be carefully managed according to evangelical 
organisations, but encouraged and celebrated according to figures like Jevons – features 
minimally in their reflections on their university experience. The compartmentalization of 
subject fields some commentators fear is damaging the quality of higher education appears 
evident in the internally differentiated identities of Christian students, for whom religion is 
something they do in one segment of their lives, while study is something altogether separate, 
the two rarely being brought into conversation.     
 This is not a phenomenon restricted to the UK. Writing about the very different US 
higher education sector, Glanzer, Hill and Ream point to the “disparity between the curricular 
and cocurricular as the reason why American college students have a reputation for vibrant 
religious practice, but not more advanced forms of religious knowledge both of their own and 
other religious traditions…” (2014: 157) Jonathan Hill explores patterns of cognition and 
knowledge legitimation among young adults in the US, focusing particularly on orientations 
to evolution and creationism, and argues for a clear distinction between learning about 
evolution and personal acceptance of it. He finds no evidence that attending college has any 
influence on whether young adults change their beliefs on these issues. Far more influential 
than formal education was stable involvement in religious subcultures of co-believers (Hill 
2014). Another US study, Tim Clydesdale’s The First Year Out (2007), identifies a pattern of 
compartmentalization among college students that presents an interesting angle on our 
present concerns. Clydesdale found that before embarking on their college education, 
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students typically placed their religious identities in an ‘identity lockbox’, leaving them 
relatively unexamined and unquestioned during their first year. Religion was treated as 
something good to have, but chiefly as a resource to draw upon later in life; in effect, the 
relationship between religion and college was distinguished by a lack of interaction. 
Moreover, it was not only religious identities which were treated in this way; Clydesdale 
found students also putting aside concerns about gender, political, racial and civic identities 
in favour of ‘daily life management’ (Clydesdale 2007: 2). They did not see their entry into a 
college education as an opportunity to examine their place in the wider world, but preferred 
to focus on more immediate concerns of relationships, personal gratifications and economic 
upkeep (2007: 2). In this sense, compartmentalization might be viewed not as a pattern of 
behavior that students simply learn by cultural osmosis, but as a deliberate strategy for coping 
with the pressures of young adult life, and there was clear evidence of this pattern in the CUE 
findings (Guest et al 2013: 118). This is, perhaps, not a surprising discovery, and reflects the 
logic of arguments about modernization that point to a heightened social differentiation or 
even privatization of religion within some western contexts. That religion is reserved as 
separate from education both structurally and in the minds of individuals is arguably as 
understandable as the similar separation of religion from political or economic spheres of life. 
However, previous sociological discussion has tended to treat these consequences of 
differentiation as latent byproducts of a broader modernization; their presence here as 
deliberate strategies deployed by individuals negotiating the challenges of university raises 
pressing questions about both the nature of religion and the character of higher education 
within contemporary Britain.  
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Concluding Comment 
Echoing the subversion of disciplinary boundaries that Douglas Davies has pursued so 
fruitfully during his academic career, my overall argument in this essay is that student life is 
most effectively understood when public rhetoric about the purpose and status of universities 
is brought into critical dialogue with empirical investigation into the student experience. 
More specifically, a proper understanding of how religion is configured within universities 
cannot be separated from broader debates about the capacity of universities to shape the 
identities of their students. The work of Collini reveals common assumptions about how 
universities do and should function, but emerging debates about the status of universities in a 
neo-liberal age need to connect critique of institutional change with patterns of engagement 
among students themselves. We have considered Christian students as a case study, subjects 
of an influential narrative that positions them as vulnerable to a disruptive, secularizing 
encounter, but whose experiences suggest something different.  The preceding discussion has 
raised far more questions than answers, but its exposure of a strategic compartmentalization 
among Christian undergraduates calls for further research into patterns of agency among the 
student body. Ongoing debates about radicalization highlight the need for a more 
sophisticated model of student identity than the passive one often rehearsed in government 
and media rhetoric.  
 I hope this discussion will continue, and conclude with a brief reflection on an issue 
that illustrates its potential benefits for wider academic discussion. It relates to the CUE 
project evidence of a strategic differentiation among Christian students, that deliberate 
process of keeping faith separate from learning that also finds evidence in US contexts. We 
might ask, does this suggest an impoverishment of the learning experience of higher 
education more generally, or just a profound curtailment of faith, which is apparently 
restricted to limited realms of interaction and thinking. Wider discussions about the 
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instrumentalisation of learning – teaching and learning ‘to the exam’ – might suggest the 
former, with matters of faith merely symptomatic of a wider tendency among students to 
prioritize the internalization of ‘facts’ over the forging of connections between new 
knowledge and pre-existing assumptions. In this sense, the study of religion in universities 
can be a case study in support of a more integrated learning experience, as Kieran Flanagan 
argues in calling for a legitimate place for reflexivity within undergraduate classes in the 
sociology of religion. It is in confronting and questioning the tensions between one’s prior 
convictions and open observation of the religious ‘other’ that we achieve an appropriately 
nuanced and responsible understanding of religious identities (Flanagan 2001). Evidence 
from the CUE project suggests such reflexivity is lacking among many Christian students, 
and yet it is in abundant evidence among Christian students of Theology and Religious 
Studies, whose considered attempts to relate class-based learning to their personal 
orientations to religion mark a notable exception to the rule. Class-based proximity to religion 
as a focus of study appears to foster creative and thoughtful engagement rather than 
disillusionment, as some advocates of secularization theory might have us believe. By 
contrast, for Christian students in other disciplines such engagement appears to be fostered 
chiefly in ‘alternative publics’, within church home groups, Bible studies or friendship 
networks, reflecting the differentiation within education highlighted above. Further 
illumination of how these social clusters of reflexivity emerge and function might be afforded 
by future studies of student faith taking an ethnographic approach alert to the subtleties of 
meaning-making among the student population. 
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